Batavia Eximp & Contracting (S) Pte Ltd v Pedregal Maritime SA (The Taikoo Brilliance) [2025] EWHC 1878 (Comm)

On 22 July 2025, the Commercial Court (Knowles J) delivered judgment in Batavia Eximp & Contracting (S) Pte Ltd v Pedregal Maritime SA (The Taikoo Brilliance) [2025] EWHC 1878 (Comm).

The case concerned the scope of the one-year time bar under Article III(6) of the Hague-Visby Rules (“the Hague-Visby Rules”) and the level of detail required in bills of lading for on-deck cargo under Article I(c).

The decision is significant: it confirms that only substantive proceedings will interrupt the one-year time bar, while adopting a pragmatic interpretation of deck-cargo notations. Together, these rulings reinforce commercial certainty in limitation periods but resist overly technical drafting requirements for bills of lading.

Background

The dispute arose from the carriage of 36,934 JAS CBM of New Zealand pine logs (“the Cargo”) on board the Taikoo Brilliance (“the Vessel”) from New Zealand to Kandla, India. Pedregal Maritime SA were the Owners of the Vessel (“the Owners”), whereas Batavia Eximp & Contracting (S) Pte Ltd were the holders of the relevant Bills of Lading (“the Bill Holders”). Four bills of lading were issued, two of which recorded substantial quantities of logs carried on deck (with an aggregate total of 34,086 pieces on deck).

On discharge at Kandla in September 2019, the Cargo was delivered without production of the bills of lading, against a letter of indemnity provided by the charterers. The Bill Holders alleged misdelivery.

Rather than commence arbitration immediately, the Bill Holders issued proceedings in Singapore in August 2020 to arrest a sister ship, the Navios Koyo. Security was provided for her release, but substantive arbitration was not commenced until December 2020—more than a year after delivery.

In arbitration, the Owners contended the claims were time-barred under Article III(6). The arbitrator agreed but held that the time bar applied only to the under-deck cargo. Both parties appealed under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996.

Issues

1. Did the Singapore arrest proceedings constitute a “suit” under Article III(6) of the Hague-Visby Rules sufficient to stop time running?
2. What must a bill of lading state for on-deck cargo to fall outside the definition of “goods” under Article I(c) of the Hague-Visby Rules?

Legal Considerations

Prior to dealing with the substantive issues, it is useful to quote Article I(c) and Article III(6) of the Hague-Visby Rules, which respectively read as follows:

“…(c) ‘Goods’ includes goods, wares, merchandise, and articles of every kind whatsoever except live animals and cargo which, by the contract of carriage, is stated as being carried on deck and is so carried…”;

“…Unless notice of loss or damage and the general nature of such loss or damage be given in writing to the carrier or his agent at the port of discharge before or at the time of the removal of the goods into the custody of the person entitled to delivery thereof under the contract of carriage, or, if the loss or damage be not apparent, within three days, such removal shall be prima facie evidence of the delivery by the carrier of the goods as described in the bill of lading.

The notice in writing need not be given if the state of the goods has, at the time of their receipt, been the subject of joint survey or inspection. Subject to paragraph 6bis, the carrier and the ship shall in any event be discharged from all liability whatsoever in respect of the goods, unless suit is brought within one year of their delivery or of the date when they should have been delivered. This period may, however, be extended if the parties so agree after the cause of action has arisen.

In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or damage, the carrier and the receiver shall give all reasonable facilities to each other for inspecting and tallying the goods.

An action for indemnity against a third person may be brought even after the expiration of the year provided for in the preceding paragraph if brought within the time allowed by the law of the Court seized of the case. However, the time allowed shall be not less than three months, commencing from the day when the person bringing such action for indemnity has settled the claim or has been served with process in the action against himself…”

1. “Suit” under Article III(6)

• Article III(6) discharges carriers from liability unless “suit” is brought within one year of delivery or the date when delivery should have occurred.
• The Bill Holders argued that the arrest proceedings in Singapore qualified as a “suit” because a substantive claim had to be pleaded to obtain security.
• The Owners contended that “suit” refers only to proceedings capable of determining liability, not security actions.
• The Honourable Mr Justice Robin Knowles J (presiding over the High Court proceedings) concurred with the Owners’ position. Drawing on the authorities of The Giant Ace [2024] UKSC 38, The Aries [1977] 1 WLR 185, and The Captain Gregos [1990] 3 All ER 967, His Lordship emphasized the commercial rationale underlying the one-year time bar: namely, to enable shipowners to “clear their books” within the prescribed twelve-month period.
• He noted that arrest proceedings run counter to the fundamental purpose of Article III(6) of the Hague-Visby Rules, which is intended to “achieve finality,” like any other time bar. Arrest proceedings, by their nature, do not resolve liability and therefore do not fulfil the objective of finality envisaged by the provision. Importantly, His Lordship was of the view that, by necessary implication, Article III(6) applies to all claims arising out of the carriage—and misdelivery—of goods, provided such claims fall within the scope of the Rules.

2. On-deck cargo under Article I(c)

• Article I(c) excludes from “goods” any cargo “which, by the contract of carriage, is stated as being carried on deck and is so carried.”
• The Owners contended that the relevant provisions required the precise identification of each parcel stowed on deck, including both the quantity of cargo carried and the number of individual parcels. In other words, a bill of lading must not only indicate that cargo was loaded or stowed on deck, but also specify the exact parcels so carried. Put differently, in the absence of a statement specifying the quantity of cargo carried on deck, it cannot be said that any particular item is “stated as being carried on deck.” Rather, the only inference that may be drawn—unless the entire cargo is stowed on deck—is that the item forms part of a bulk consignment which, in fact, was carried on deck.
• The court rejected this restrictive approach.
• Knowles J concurred with the view that the purpose of Article I(c) is to enable the holder of the bill to determine whether the goods fall within the scope of the Rules. This determination directly influences the applicable liability regime and may have significant implications for insurance coverage.
• The bills of lading, which stated that 22,994 and 11,092 pieces respectively were carried on deck, were held sufficient.
• Knowles J endorsed a pragmatic, commercial interpretation: what is required will vary depending on the cargo and context. Aggregate figures may suffice for homogeneous cargo.
• The court drew on comparative jurisprudence, including the Canadian Gearbulk cases, and reiterated the importance of international uniformity in interpreting maritime conventions.

Decision

• On limitation: The Owners succeeded. Arrest or security proceedings do not amount to “suit” under Article III(6); only substantive proceedings stop time.
• On deck cargo: The Bill Holders succeeded. Stating the quantity of on-deck cargo in the bills of lading was sufficient to exclude that cargo from the Hague-Visby regime.

Impact and Practitioner Points

• Limitation strictness:
  • Proceedings for security will not interrupt the one-year period under Article III(6).
  • Cargo interests must either secure a time extension or commence substantive arbitration/court proceedings within one year, regardless of arrests elsewhere.
• Deck cargo notations:
  • Aggregate statements of quantity can satisfy Article I(c), especially for homogeneous cargo.
  • Nevertheless, best practice is to provide as much specificity as possible to avoid factual disputes.
• International uniformity:
  • The judgment underscores the need for consistent interpretation of international conventions, aligning with Canadian and Singaporean jurisprudence.
  • This ensures predictability for parties trading across multiple jurisdictions.
• Strategic lessons:
  • Cargo interests: arrests provide security but do not preserve rights—merits proceedings must still be brought in time.
  • Owners and insurers: vague deck notations may still be upheld, but careful scrutiny remains warranted in mixed or commingled cargo cases.

Conclusion

The Taikoo Brilliance judgment strengthens the balance struck by the Hague-Visby Rules. It confirms that substantive proceedings are indispensable to interrupt the one-year time