Spotlight on DMZ v DNA: Singapore Court of Appeal Clarifies Court Intervention in Arbitration

The Singapore Court of Appeal in DMZ v DNA [2025] SGCA 52 clarifies the limits of court intervention under Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The decision is significant given the limited international case law on this issue.

The recent Singapore Court of Appeal decision of DMZ v DNA [2025] SGCA 52 provides a timely and significant clarification on the scope and operation of Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 (“Model Law”), particularly in the context of applications seeking judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings. Even on the international stage, jurisprudence on this issue remains limited.

This case arose from a party’s challenge against the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) Registrar’s determination of the commencement date of arbitration proceedings administered by the SIAC.

In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal clarified the application of Article 5 of the Model Law under Singapore law and reaffirmed the foundational principle of minimal curial intervention.

Background

DNA commenced arbitration proceedings against DMZ at the SIAC under the SIAC Arbitration Rules 2016 (“SIAC Rules”). DNA’s Notice of Arbitration was submitted shortly before the expiry of the claim’s limitation period.

Rule 3.3 of the SIAC Rules provides for the commencement date to be determined by the SIAC Registrar.

As DNA did not respond to certain queries from the SIAC Registrar, the Registrar initially deemed the arbitration to have commenced on 3 July 2024 — a date that falls after the expiry of the applicable limitation period. Upon receiving DMZ’s Defence and noting its reliance on a time-bar defence, DNA requested the SIAC Registrar to amend the commencement date.

After hearing submissions from both parties, the SIAC Registrar revised the commencement date to 24 June 2024, which fell before the expiry of the limitation period.

DMZ subsequently applied to the High Court to challenge the SIAC’s revision of the commencement date. DMZ first sought permission to proceed against DNA (which was insolvent). The High Court dismissed the permission application, holding that the application would fail even on a prima facie basis. DMZ then appealed against the High Court decision before the Court of Appeal.

The Decision

The Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court that it lacked the power to grant the declarations sought by DMZ and dismissed the appeal.

Key Takeaways

1. The Proper Framing of the “Matter” Governed by the Model Law

The central issue before the Court of Appeal was the interpretation of Article 5 of the Model Law, which provides that “[i]n matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in this Law”.

To determine if intervention was permissible, the Court of Appeal interpreted Article 5 of the Model Law using a two-step test:

1. Does the application concern a “matter” governed by the Model Law?
2. Is intervention expressly permitted by legislation, or is the matter outside the scope of the relevant legislation?

On the first step, the Court held that the policy purpose of Article 5 is to:

1. Maximise certainty as to when a court may intervene; and
2. Minimise the extent of such intervention.

Accordingly, the word “matters” in Article 5 should be construed broadly. A broad construction encompasses challenges against procedural determinations affecting the progress or conduct of an ongoing arbitration, as in this case. The Court therefore concluded it had no power to interfere with the SIAC Registrar’s procedural ruling.

2. Clarification of Sun Travels

DMZ argued that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Sun Travels & Tours Pvt Ltd v Hilton International Manage (Maldives) Pvt Ltd [2019] 1 SLR 732 suggested a narrow reading of Article 5 of the Model Law, limiting intervention only where expressly regulated by the International Arbitration Act 1994 (the “IAA”).

In Sun Travels, the Court of Appeal suggested at [134] and [135] that:

• “[…] in situations that are expressly regulated by the Act, the courts should only intervene where so provided in the Act”; and
• Where “there is no specific provision in the IAA or the Model Law which addresses the specific declarations […] nothing in the IAA and the Model Law circumscribes the court’s power to grant the declaratory relief sought.”

The Court of Appeal acknowledged that, at first blush, the above might suggest that because the IAA does not expressly address the declarations sought by DMZ, such relief would not be barred by Article 5 of the Model Law.

However, the Court of Appeal distinguished Sun Travels on the basis that the declarations in that case were sought and granted after arbitration had concluded, such that Article 5 of the Model Law was not engaged.

3. Waiver of Right of Appeal or Review Under Rule 40.2 of the SIAC Rules 2016 is Enforceable

The Court of Appeal also rejected DMZ’s argument that Rule 40.2 of the SIAC Rules—which provides that “[s]ave in respect of Rule 16.1 and Rule 28.1, the parties waive any right of appeal or review in respect of any decisions of the President, the Court and the Registrar to any State court or other judicial authority]” was a clause ousting the Court’s jurisdiction.

The Court held that Rule 40.2 does not oust jurisdiction. Instead, it reflects party autonomy.

The Court of Appeal explained that the SIAC Registrar’s decisions are presumptively administrative and unlikely to affect substantive rights. If a decision materially prejudices a party, recourse remains available post-award (e.g., setting aside under Article 34 of the Model Law and Section 24 of the IAA). If the SIAC Registrar’s decision impacts the merits (e.g., time-bar defences), parties may challenge the award relying on that decision. However, if the SIAC Rules make the SIAC Registrar’s decision final, that consequence flows from the parties’ choice to adopt those rules.

Conclusion

This decision reinforces Singapore’s pro-arbitration stance, confirming that the Singapore courts will rarely intervene in arbitral procedure mid-stream. Institutional rulings under agreed rules are treated as part of party autonomy, but recourse remains available at the award stage.

This reflects a balanced approach that preserves due process without undermining efficiency. It is consistent not only with academic commentary on judicial review which cautions against review during ongoing proceedings but also with the historical development of the “administrative” characterisation of institutional decisions.

This article was originally published on Daily Jus on Friday 6th of February, with thanks to Jus Mundi & Jus Connect.