MAERSK SEOUL: dangerous goods, container packing, and the consequences of getting it wrong

The English Commercial Court's recent decision in Maersk A/S v Sree Rayalaseema Hi-Strength Hypo Ltd (MV Maersk Seoul) [2026] EWHC 2005 (Comm) provides a useful reminder of the potentially significant exposure facing shippers of dangerous goods where cargo is improperly packed for carriage by sea.

The case arose from an explosion and fire aboard the MAERSK SEOUL in July 2015. More than a decade later, the shipper was held liable for losses exceeding USD 13 million.

The judgment is particularly noteworthy because the cargo had not simply been misdeclared or shipped without the carrier knowing that it was dangerous. The carrier knew that it was carrying calcium hypochlorite, a Class 5.1 dangerous good. The problem was the manner in which the cargo had been packed and stuffed into the containers.

What happened?

Sree Rayalaseema Hi-Strength Hypo Limited (Sree), an Indian chemical manufacturer, shipped a number of containers of calcium hypochlorite with Maersk. Three of those containers were loaded aboard the MAERSK SEOUL at Jebel Ali.

On 19 July 2015, shortly after the vessel departed Jebel Ali, an explosion and fire occurred in the forward part of the vessel.

Calcium hypochlorite is a self-heating substance. In ordinary circumstances, heat generated by its decomposition can dissipate into the surrounding environment. If that heat cannot escape sufficiently, however, increasing temperatures can accelerate the decomposition process until it becomes self-sustaining, resulting in violent decomposition and the ignition of surrounding combustible material.

The evidence pointed strongly towards Sree's cargo. Members of the crew reported a chlorine smell and observed debris and white material in the vicinity of the affected containers. More significantly, another consignment of calcium hypochlorite shipped by Sree at around the same time was subsequently discharged and cross-stuffed at Jebel Ali. During that operation, a further violent decomposition and fire occurred.

The Court accepted the expert evidence that the fire aboard the MAERSK SEOUL had been caused by the violent decomposition of calcium hypochlorite in one or both of Sree's containers.

The importance of how dangerous goods are packed

The central problem was the manner in which the calcium hypochlorite had been packed.

The applicable IMDG Code provisions required packages within containers to permit adequate air circulation throughout the cargo. Instead, the cartons containing the calcium hypochlorite had effectively been packed together as a block, restricting both air circulation and the dissipation of heat.

The expert evidence was that compliance with the IMDG Code requirement would have greatly reduced the risk of a runaway reaction and, more likely than not, would have prevented the casualty.

That finding is important. Dangerous goods obligations are not confined to correctly identifying and declaring the nature of the cargo. Depending on the cargo concerned, compliance with the applicable packing, stowage and segregation requirements may itself be critical to whether the cargo can safely withstand an ocean voyage.

The shipper's liability

The contracts of carriage incorporated Safmarine's standard terms. The Court found that those terms had been sufficiently brought to Sree's attention notwithstanding that Maersk could not produce a complete set of booking confirmations and final bills of lading for every shipment.

Those terms contained several provisions which proved significant.

In particular, Sree warranted that dangerous goods would be packed adequately to withstand the risks of carriage and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. By failing to pack the calcium hypochlorite in accordance with the IMDG Code, Sree breached that warranty and became liable to indemnify Maersk for the resulting losses.

Sree had also warranted that its goods would not cause loss or damage to Maersk or other cargo. That warranty was similarly breached.

The Court went further and held that Sree was liable at common law. A shipper is under a duty to take reasonable care when presenting goods for carriage to ensure that they can be transported without causing physical damage to the property of others. Sree's failure properly to pack the calcium hypochlorite amounted to a breach of that duty.

The result was substantial. Maersk was entitled to recover payments made to the vessel's head owners and salvors, settlements with cargo interests and various other losses. The recoverable losses were quantified at approximately USD 13.18 million.

An interesting aspect of the judgment is that Maersk's own dangerous goods procedures were not beyond criticism. Its Dangerous Goods Team had not checked the relevant stuffing reports before shipment and the containers did not comply with aspects of Maersk's own acceptance policy. However, the Court found no evidence that this was the real or operative cause of the casualty.

A second dispute: where should the claim be heard?

The casualty also generated a lengthy jurisdictional dispute.

The Safmarine terms provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the English High Court. Sree nevertheless commenced and pursued several proceedings before the Indian courts which were aimed, in substance, at preventing Maersk from pursuing its English claim.

The Commercial Court held that those proceedings constituted continuing breaches of the exclusive English jurisdiction agreement. It awarded Maersk its losses resulting from those breaches, including legal costs incurred in India and England, and granted a permanent anti-suit injunction together with mandatory relief requiring Sree to discontinue the Indian proceedings.

The message is straightforward: an exclusive jurisdiction clause is not merely procedural boilerplate. It is a contractual promise, and a party which deliberately litigates elsewhere may find itself liable not only to an injunction but also for the costs its counterparty incurs enforcing that promise.

Comment

The most useful aspect of MAERSK SEOUL is perhaps that it demonstrates how quickly a packing failure can become a major marine casualty.

For shippers of dangerous goods, accurate declaration is only part of the exercise. The physical characteristics of the cargo, its packaging, and the way in which it is stuffed into a container can be equally important. Compliance with the IMDG Code is therefore not simply a documentary exercise: the requirements are directed at the physical risks which may arise during carriage.

For carriers and their insurers, the judgment also illustrates the importance of preserving the contractual chain following a casualty. Maersk's recovery extended well beyond physical damage to the vessel and included salvage liabilities, settlements with other cargo interests and associated professional costs. The Court accepted that a party exposed to third-party claims as a consequence of another party's breach may recover the reasonable cost of settling those claims; it need not establish that it would necessarily have been held liable had each underlying claim proceeded to judgment.

There is, however, a further practical lesson for carriers. Maersk ultimately succeeded despite shortcomings in its own dangerous goods acceptance process. A different evidential picture on causation, or a properly advanced contributory negligence case, could potentially have made those shortcomings considerably more important.

MAERSK SEOUL therefore serves as a reminder on both sides of the bill of lading: dangerous goods require more than the correct label. Shippers must ensure that the cargo is actually prepared and packed safely for the contemplated voyage, while carriers should ensure that their own dangerous goods procedures are followed in practice.