Why strict adherence to CPR procedure remains essential for service of a Claim Form

In the recent case of Coal Pension Properties Ltd v Mace Living Ltd & Ors [2026] EWHC 1248 (TCC) (26 May 2026), the Technology and Construction Court (the TCC) reaffirmed the strict requirements for service of a Claim Form under CPR Part 6, which remain crucial, and not a mere technicality.

Introduction

In rejecting the Claimant’s arguments that there had been valid service, and its alternative application to permit alternative service under CPR 6.15, the TCC held that the Claim Form, which related to a dispute worth over £100m, was not validly served in time.

Background

The dispute arose from a long-running, high-value construction claim between Coal Pension Properties Ltd (CPPL) and Mace Living Limited, Mace Limited and Mace MEP Services Limited (together, “Mace”), concerning a building completed in 2011. A Claim Form was issued in December 2021, but the parties agreed a series of extensions for service of the Claim Form, with a final deadline of 2 February 2026.

At 16:46 on 2 February 2026, CPPL’s solicitors purported to serve the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim by email on Clyde & Co LLP, who act for Mace. Clyde & Co challenged service on the basis that (having never been asked) it had not agreed to accept service by email and, in any event, was not authorised to accept service on behalf of Mace. CPPL applied to the court for, materially, a declaration that the Claim Form had been validly served in accordance with the requirements of CPR 6.7 and Practice Direction 6A, or, in the alternative, an Order permitting service of the Claim at an alternative location and by an alternative method under CPR 6.15. Mace issued a cross-application, seeking a declaration that the court lacked jurisdiction to try the claim.

The Law

Electronic service: under CPR 6.3(1)(d), a claim form may be served by electronic means, including by email, but only if the requirements of Practice Direction 6A are satisfied. In particular:

• written consent is required: the party to be served (or its solicitor) must have indicated in writing that it is willing to accept service by email and must specify the email address(es) to be used for service (paragraph 4.1); and
• limitations must be confirmed: the serving party must confirm any file size or format limitations before service (paragraph 4.2).

Service on a solicitor: service on a defendant’s solicitors is only valid where CPR 6.7(1)(b) is satisfied. A claim form may only be served on a solicitor where that solicitor has expressly notified the serving party in writing that they are instructed to accept service on behalf of their client.

Issues in Dispute

While the law above was not disputed, there was disagreement over its application to the facts. CPPL argued that Clyde & Co had provided notice that it was authorised to accept service on behalf of Mace by way of a draft N244 application notice relating to an extension of time for service of the Claim Form in 2023, which included the email addresses of two Clyde & Co solicitors as contacts for service to which documents about that application should be sent. CPPL argued that the Claim Form was one of the documents about the application.

CPPL further argued that wording in an email footer included in Clyde & Co’s emails sent during the Covid-19 pandemic amounted to consent to email service.

The Judgment

1. Validity of service

The TCC held that the purported service of the Claim Form on 2 February 2026 was not valid. The TCC rejected CPPL’s argument that the draft N244 form constituted appropriate notice under CPR 6.7, which requires clear and express notification. The TCC relied heavily on the judgment in LSREF 3 Tiger Falkirk Ltd I S.a.r.l & Anor v Paragon Building Consultancy Ltd [2021] EWHC 2063 (TCC) (22 July 2021), which reiterated the principles in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12, and had similar facts to the present case.

On the issue of specific authority, the Paragon case had addressed, by reference to earlier caselaw, the importance for specific authority by solicitors to accept service for a defendant.

"It is an important matter as between clients and solicitors since holding a solicitor to have accepted service on behalf of a client notwithstanding that the solicitor had not said he was authorised to accept service or even been asked whether he was authorised to accept service could expose a solicitor without actual authority to accept service to regulatory action or a claim."

The draft N244 related to extensions of time, not service, and therefore the TCC held it could not reasonably be construed as notification under CPR 6.7. The Judge observed that “experienced solicitors should have understood the fundamental importance of clarity as to whether a defendant’s solicitor had authority to accept service, not least because of the authorities to which Fraser J. referred [in Paragon], all of which antedated the draft Form N244”.

The TCC dealt only briefly with the email service arguments, as the above point was sufficient to establish that there had been no valid service. Unusually, the very same Covid email footer had been considered by Fraser J in Paragon. In that case, it was held that the footer complied with paragraph 4.1 of Practice Direction 6A (i.e. it indicated a willingness to accept service of documents by email) but it did not amount to a notification of authority under CPR 6.7 or compliance with paragraph 4.2 of Practice Direction 6A.

Further, unlike in Paragon, this dispute arose after Clyde & Co had ceased to use the Covid email footer. Clyde & Co had used a new email footer since July 2022 which required service to a particular email address, and this was not complied with, nor were the terms of paragraph 4.2 of PD 6A.

2. Application under CPR 6.15

The Claimant also made an application, in the alternative, permitting service at an alternative place and method under CPR 6.15. The TCC considered the principles summarised by the Court of Appeal in The Good Law Project, R (On the Application Of) v The Secretary of State for Health And Social Care)(Rev1) [2022] EWCA Civ 355 (24 March 2022), drawing from Barton and other relevant case law. The key factors in determining an application under CPR 6.15 are:

​​​a. whether the Claimant took reasonable steps to comply with the rules;

b. whether the Defendant was aware of the contents of the Claim Form; and

c. what, if any, prejudice the Defendant would suffer, including loss of any limitation defence.

On point 1, the TCC held that the answer was “no” because (as in Paragon), the Claimant had failed to take the basic step of asking whether Clyde & Co had authority to accept service: “at their heart the Claimant’s problems stem in large part from leaving service until a very late stage”.

On point 2, the answer was “yes” but the authorities are clear that knowledge of the Claim Form alone does not, without more, constitute a “good reason” to justify retrospective validation under 6.15.

On point 3, the TCC held that if the application under CPR 6.15 was allowed, Mace would be deprived of an accrued limitation defence. The TCC also found that the Claimant’s potential alternative claim under the Defective Premises Act 1972 did not advance its case, as the Claimant may not be prejudiced (or in large part may not be prejudiced), by an inability to pursue the claim in contract or in tort.  In contrast, if retrospective validation were granted under 6.15, Mace would have been deprived the opportunity to advance a limitation defence.

The TCC therefore found there were no facts or circumstances providing a “good reason” for the application under CPR 6.15 to succeed, and the application was dismissed.

Conclusion

The judgment is a clear reminder that service of an originating process is a distinct and critical procedural step which must be treated separately from the general conduct of litigation. The rules governing service are strict and will be applied rigorously, and this applies equally in long-running disputes where there has been extensive email correspondence and familiarity between the parties.

For practitioners, the lessons are clear:

• Always obtain written confirmation that solicitors are instructed to accept service. Treat service as a standalone procedural step that requires independent verification.
• Do not assume consent to email service, and always follow the requirements set out in Practice Direction 6A.
• Do not leave service to the last moment. Doing so will only amount to “courting disaster” and even a minor oversight can have decisive consequences.

The judgment comes at a time when the Civil Procedure Rule Committee is actively considering reforms to modernise CPR Part 6, including updating the rules on electronic service. However, this judgment underlines that until such reforms are implemented, the courts will continue to enforce the existing rules strictly. Even under a modernised regime, the underlying emphasis on clarity, certainty, and formal compliance is unlikely to diminish.