Tanzania’s New Regulations on Abuse of Dominant Position, 2026: What Businesses Need to Know

  • Bulletin 4 septembre 2026 4 septembre 2026
  • Afrique

  • Réformes réglementaires

  • Pratiques professionnelles

On 14th August 2026, the Government of Tanzania gazetted and published the Fair Competition (Abuse of Dominant Position) Regulations, 2026, Government Notice No. 244 of 2026 (the Regulations).

The Regulations are made under section 99 of the Fair Competition Act, Chapter 285 Revised Edition 2023 (the FCA). The Regulations give the Fair Competition Commission (the FCC) its first detailed framework for assessing market dominance and controlling market abuse in Tanzania. The Regulations are thus relevant to businesses controlling infrastructure, inputs or other resources that may constitute essential facilities in Tanzania.

In this legal update, we discuss the key highlights and provisions introduced by the Regulations.

Definition of Key terms

The Regulations clearly define the following terms:

“bundling” means the way products are offered and priced by the dominant firms whereby, in case of pure bundling, products are only sold jointly in fixed proportions, in the case of mixed bundling, a malt-product rebate, the products are also made available separately, but the sum of the price when sold separately is higher than the bundled price;

“essential facility” means any infrastructure, resource, raw material or service that is critical for the functioning of a particular market, which cannot reasonably be duplicated and is necessary for competition or operation within that market;

“predatory pricing” means a price exclusionary tactic where a dominant firm deliberately sets prices lower than its costs in order to drive out equally efficient competitors; and

“tying” means the situation where a customer that purchases one product is required also to purchase another product from the dominant firm.

Framework for assessing Dominance and Abusive Conduct in the Market

The Regulations provide greater detail on how the FCC will assess whether a person is in a dominant position and whether conduct amounts to an abuse of that position. They therefore provide businesses with a more detailed framework against which potentially high-risk commercial practices can be assessed.

Importantly, being ‘dominant’ is not, in itself, prohibited under the Regulations. The regulatory concern arises where an undertaking with dominance engages in conduct that has the purpose, effect or likely effect of exploiting customers or preventing, restricting or distorting competition. 

When will a business be considered dominant?

Regulation 3 of the Regulations requires the FCC to consider a number of factors when determining whether a person has a dominant position.

As a starting point, the FCC will consider whether a person, either individually or jointly with others, has maintained a market share exceeding 40% for a significant period of time. However, market share is not determinative and the FCC may also consider:

  • the extent to which customers, consumers or suppliers depend on the undertaking;
  • the undertaking’s ability to set prices or other terms independently of competitors;
  • whether large customers have sufficient countervailing bargaining power;
  • competition from imported goods or services;
  • control over, or privileged access to, essential inputs or facilities; and
  • barriers to entry or expansion, including economies of scale, transport costs, regulatory barriers, technological advantages and high capital costs.

The Regulations therefore make clear that market share should not be considered in isolation.

For businesses operating in concentrated markets, a useful first step will be to assess not only their market share but also the degree of dependence of customers and suppliers, the availability of alternatives and the practical ability of competitors to enter or expand. Businesses should not treat the 40% threshold as a prohibition on having a large market share. Rather, businesses approaching or exceeding the threshold should understand how their commercial conduct may be scrutinised.

Defining the relevant market

Before dominance can be assessed, the relevant market must be considered. Regulation 4 of the Regulations requires the FCC to consider; 

  • the product market; and
  • the geographic market.

This will be particularly significant for businesses whose products or services compete across different geographic markets, or where imported products provide meaningful competitive constraints.

What conduct may amount to abuse? 

The Regulations provide detailed criteria for a range of conduct that may constitute abuse of dominant position as summarised in the table below.

Form of abuse

Description

Unfair trading conditions Under Regulation 6, exploitative abuse may arise where a dominant undertaking imposes unfairly low prices on suppliers or other exploitative terms on customers or suppliers.
Predatory pricing Regulation 7 addresses pricing below cost. The FCC may find predatory pricing where prices remain below cost for a sustained period, the undertaking is dominant, there is evidence that it can sustain losses, and there is a likelihood that those losses can subsequently be recouped through future price increases or other restrictive conduct.
Margin squeeze A margin squeeze may arise where a dominant undertaking controls an essential upstream input and its pricing structure prevents an efficient downstream competitor from trading profitably. Notably, Regulation 8 of the Regulations states that downstream dominance does not need to be demonstrated.
Cross-subsidisation Regulation 9 of the Regulations addresses cross-subsidisation where costs are shifted between goods, markets or services, particularly where there is evidence of below-cost pricing, consumer harm, impediments to market entry or the survival of smaller competitors.
Refusal to deal Regulations 10 addresses refusal to deal to essential facilities or inputs. The Regulations are therefore particularly relevant to businesses controlling infrastructure or other resources that competitors may need in order to compete effectively.
Denial of essential facility/input A denial of access may attract scrutiny where the facility or input is indispensable, cannot reasonably be duplicated or substituted, is controlled by the dominant firm and there is no viable alternative.

Tying and bundling

Regulation 2 and 12 of the Regulations distinguish between tying and bundling and provide criteria for determining when such practices may constitute abuse.

The FCC may intervene where there are separate relevant markets for the products, the undertaking is dominant in at least one market, customers have no meaningful choice regarding the tied or bundled products, and the practice restricts competition without sufficient efficiencies to compensate for the competitive harm.

Price discrimination Different prices are not automatically prohibited. Regulation 13 focuses on circumstances where the same product or service is sold at different prices to different customers or market segments without cost justification, where the dominant undertaking can control arbitrage and the conduct has an exploitative or anti-competitive purpose or effect. 
Loyalty discounts / rebates

Loyalty discount and rebate schemes may attract scrutiny where the undertaking is dominant, the scheme has an exclusionary effect and the conduct has the purpose, effect or likely effect of appreciably preventing, restricting or distorting competition.

This is particularly relevant to sales, distribution and procurement teams that use volume rebates, loyalty programmes, exclusivity incentives or similar commercial mechanisms.

Abuse of IP rights

Regulation 15 extends the competition analysis into IP-related conduct.

Potentially problematic conduct includes unjustified refusal to license, disproportionately high licensing fees, discriminatory licensing terms, requiring unnecessary additional licences or conditions, strategically creating patent thickets and initiating legal proceedings solely to harass competitors or delay market entry.

Unrelated supplementary conditions

Regulation 16 addresses agreements that make acceptance of obligations unrelated to the core subject matter of the agreement a condition of contracting.

A supplementary condition may include an obligation, requirement or restriction unrelated to the core subject matter of the agreement.

This may be relevant when reviewing commercial agreements containing ancillary obligations, particularly where the contracting party has significant market power.

 

Alignment with the Fair Competition Act

The Regulations largely complement and give practical effect to the existing abuse of dominance provisions under the FCA. They do so by providing a structured framework for assessing dominance, elaborating the factors relevant to market power, setting out assessment criteria for conduct already recognised as abusive under the FCA, and clarifying that dominance itself is not unlawful unless it is exercised in a manner that exploits consumers or restricts competition.

In doing so, the Regulations enhance transparency and provide businesses with greater certainty as to how the FCC is likely to assess allegations of abuse of dominant position.

Practical implications for Businesses

  • Businesses should identify whether they may be dominant by assessing the wider factors identified by Regulation 3 including customer and supplier dependency, alternative suppliers, import competition, countervailing buyer power and barriers to entry.
  • Documentation of commercial rationale of pricing, rebates, discounts and promotional strategies, particularly where pricing falls below cost, differs significantly between customers or markets, or is accompanied by loyalty or exclusivity conditions.
  • Businesses with substantial markets power should consider reviewing contractual obligations or arrangements to identify provisions that could potentially be characterised as exploitative or exclusionary.
  • Businesses controlling infrastructure, technology, raw materials or services that competitors cannot reasonably duplicate should assess whether those resources could qualify as essential facilities or inputs.
  • IP owners with significant market power should ensure that licensing, royalty, enforcement and access decisions are assessed not only from an IP perspective but also from a competition-law perspective.

Conclusion

While the FCA has long prohibited the abuse of a dominant position, businesses have had limited guidance on how the FCC would assess dominance and specific forms of potentially abusive conduct. The Regulations therefore represent an important development in Tanzania's competition law framework by providing a clearer, more predictable and structured approach to enforcement, while remaining largely consistent with the principles and prohibitions already established under the FCA.

The significance of the Regulations lies not in creating new competition law obligations, but in setting out detailed criteria for determining when market power exists and how particular conduct will be assessed. They therefore provide businesses with greater visibility on the FCC's enforcement approach and the factors it will consider when investigating suspected abuses of dominance.

For businesses operating in concentrated or regulated sectors, the practical question is no longer simply "Are we dominant?"

It is also: "If we are dominant, could any aspect of our pricing practices, contractual arrangements, distribution models, licensing terms, access conditions or dealings with customers, suppliers or competitors be viewed as abusive under the Regulations?"

Businesses that may fall within the scope of the Regulations should consider conducting a targeted competition law review of their commercial practices, pricing policies, supply and distribution arrangements, rebate schemes, access policies and contractual terms to ensure they remain compliant with both the FCA and the Regulations.

Fin

Clyde.Insights.Areas:

  • Développement en droit

Auteurs supplémentaires:

Mark Malekela, Trainee, Dar es Salaam

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